The objective of this study was to describe the developmental pro-23 gression of counterfactual reasoning from childhood to adulthood. 24 In contrast to the traditional view, it was recently reported by 25 Rafetseder and colleagues that even a majority of 6-year-old 
Introduction

46
Throughout the day, adults drift off into fictional worlds when they watch movies, read books, tell 47 fairy tales, think about their future, or moan about missed opportunities. The ability to imagine fic- 48 tional worlds can already be observed in very young children when they create imaginary companions 49 (Taylor, 1999) or engage in pretend play (e.g., pouring pretend tea into a cup by lifting an empty teapot 50 above the cup and tilting the teapot as described by Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993) . Although these are 51 very different ways of imagining, they have at least one feature in common: They are to a certain ex-52 tent similar to the real world. This is because fictional worlds can never be described to a full extent, 53 and missing information needs to be imported from real-world knowledge (see Skolnick Weisberg & 54 Goodstein, 2009, for factors that determine what is imported). 55 Importing world knowledge into imagined worlds is also crucial for counterfactual reasoning (CFR). 56 Creating a counterfactual world has been defined as creating an imagined world as close as possible to 57 the actual world (Lewis, 1973) . CFR ''involves a change in some features of the actual world in addition 58 to those required by the truth of the antecedent of the counterfactual, while other such features are 59 left unchanged'' (Woodward, 2011, p. 21) . Edgington (2011) clarified that features should be changed 60 only when they are causally dependent on the antecedent of the counterfactual. The fact that adults 61 are quite successful in reaching a consensus about counterfactuals suggests that CFR is a highly struc-62 tured process (Pearl, 2011) . 63 Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, and Perner (2010) investigated whether adults and children agree on 64 what needs to be changed and what needs to be left unchanged in order to create a counterfactual 65 world. They used stories that were acted out with dolls. For instance, in one story world, a mother 66 sometimes placed candy on the top shelf and sometimes placed it on the bottom shelf of a cupboard. 67 In Studies 2 and 3, her tall son could only reach the top shelf (he had his leg in a cast and could not 68 kneel down to reach the bottom shelf), and his little sister could only reach the bottom shelf (she was 69 not tall enough to reach the top shelf). When the boy came looking for the candy, it ended up in his 70 room only if it had been placed on the top shelf. If the candy had been placed on the bottom shelf, he 71 was unable to reach it and it remained there. Similarly, when his sister came looking for the candy, it 72 ended up in her room only if it had been placed on the bottom shelf. If the candy had been placed on 73 the top shelf, it remained there. 74 Adults and children had no problem in predicting what would happen when, for example, the can-75 dy was on the top shelf and the girl came; the candy would stay on that shelf and so forth (Rafetseder 76 et al., 2010). Adults, unlike children, were also able to answer counterfactual questions such as the fol-77 lowing (Example 1). The mother placed the candy on the top shelf, and the boy took it to his room.
78
What if the little girl had come instead of the boy? Where would the candy be? Remarkably, 100% 79 of the adults, but only 24% of the 6-year-olds, answered correctly that the candy would have stayed 80 on the top shelf. None of the adults, but most of the children, said that the candy would have ended 81 up in the girl's room (which would be the result in a possible world where the candy was on the bot-82 tom shelf-in contrast to where it actually was-and the fact that the girl came to get it). There was a To date, it is not clear what accounts for these age discrepancies. Because children's executive func-101 tioning improves throughout preschool (Carlson, 2005) , it has been suggested that executive function-102 ing explains these discrepancies. is only one study that checked for answers based on BCR, and this study was conducted with children 131 who were 6 years of age or younger and whose performance was close to floor in the critical condition 132 . So, our first aim was to establish when children become able to give the same 133 answer as adults in this condition.
134
Study 1
135
The current study used the paradigm of Rafetseder and colleagues (2010, Studies 2 and 3), who col-136 lected data with 5-and 6-year-old children as well as with adults ranging in age from 14;7 to 75;10 137 (years;months). The main aim of the current study was to look at the developmental trajectory of CFR 138 beyond 6 years of age with 9-to 14-year-olds when controlling for answers based on BCR.
139
Method
140
Participants
141
The sample consisted of 34 children and adolescents (11 girls and 23 boys) from a nursery school, 142 two youth centers, and a scout group. The age range was between 9;0 and 14;5. The mean age was 143 11;9 with a standard deviation of 2;0. For later analysis, the overall sample was split into two age 144 groups. The ages of the 18 children ranged from 9;0 to 11;1 (M = 10;0, SD = 0;7), and the ages of 145 the 16 adolescents ranged from 12;5 to 14;5 (M = 13;9, SD = 0;8). In this and the subsequent study, 146 children and adolescents were recruited by writing to the parents of the children and adolescents from 1 Obermayr (2011) showed that when children are told that the mother has placed the candy into one of the boxes (without being told which box) and are then asked ''What will happen to the candy when the girl comes looking for it?'' 71% (n = 17) of the 6-to 9-year-olds answered accordingly with ''it will end up in the girl's room'', whereas only one child stated that more information is needed in order to be able to answer this question. Three further children went for the assumption that the girl is not tall enough and, therefore, that the candy will stay in the top box.
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each institution that participated in the study. The model for the second story, the dwarf story, consisted of a hut and a large walnut tree located ''What will happen to the candy when the boy comes looking for it?'') and a subjunctive past (coun- 
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In the most critical conditions (discriminating answers based on BCR from answers based on CFR, 225 represented by the dashed lines in Fig. 1 ), the performance of the 9-to 11-year-olds was significantly 226 different from the performance of the 12-to 14-year-olds; whereas the 9-to 11-year-olds answered The performance of the 9-to 11-year-olds (current study) was similar to that of the 6-year-olds in 238 Rafetseder and colleagues (2010, Study 2). In contrast, the performance of the 12-to 14-year-olds 239 (current study) was very different from that of the 6-year-olds in the most critical conditions (dashed 240 line in Fig. 1 Carol takes her shoes off, the floor will stay clean.
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To prevent confusion, we refer to the counterfactual task that can be solved even with BCR as the 276 undiscriminating task (BCR = CFR) and refer to the counterfactual task that can be solved only with 277 CFR as the discriminating task (BCR -CFR). We are not claiming that participants who apply CFR 278 on both tasks would find it easier to do so on the undiscriminating task than on the discriminating 279 task. The main difference is that we can distinguish BCR from CFR in the discriminating task, whereas 280 this is not possible in the undiscriminating task. Based on Study 1, we expect that children up to 281 11 years of age find the task in which BCR leads them to the correct answer to be easy, but find the 282 task in which BCR leads them to the wrong answer to be difficult. As children increase in age, this dif- The test was conducted in a quiet area at the respective institution and took approximately 15 min.
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The procedure was the same in each age group. Every participant was told all four stories, which were 318 acted out with props. The participant was then asked questions that needed to be answered verbally 319 and by also pointing to a picture. For example, in the undiscriminating version of the dirty shoes story, were the same across conditions and to prevent these from having an impact on the subsequent coun-336 terfactual questions.
337
The logic of the other three stories was the same. In the undiscriminating version of the sleeping 338 story, a baby was sleeping when her older sister came home, started playing the drums, and woke 339 the baby up. Then, the child was asked whether the baby would be awake or asleep if the sister 340 had not played the drums. In the discriminating version, the sister was again playing the drums, ipants to make these assumptions (as also indicated by adults' answers). Second, these problems did 379 not occur in the other stories because the two events were clearly causally independent and these sto-380 ries did not differ significantly from the sleeping story in terms of correct answers.
381
The 7-to 10-year-olds gave perfect answers in the undiscriminating version but not in the discrim- (n = 13) gave no correct answer, 35% (n = 7) gave one correct answer, and no child answered both sub-396 junctive past questions of the discriminating version correctly. The 5-year-olds gave significantly few-397 er correct answers in the discriminating version than all of the other groups (smallest difference with 398 the 7-to 10-year-olds: U = 118.5, z = -2.42, p = .02; effect size estimate: r = .38). Harris and colleagues with 3-year-olds who answered 75% of counterfactual questions correctly. In 402 our study, 5-and 6-year-olds answered 93% correctly. However, the findings by Rafetseder and 403 colleagues (2010) and in our Study 2 raise the question of whether children at this early age were giv-404 ing correct answers because they were applying CFR or because they were using BCR. In Study 2, 405 therefore, we used the discriminating version of the task by Harris and colleagues (1996) , in which 406 answers based on CFR could be distinguished from answers based on BCR. The 5-year-olds' correct an-407 swers dropped to 18%, and even the 7-to 10-year-olds answered only 53% of the questions correctly. It 408 was not until around 13 to 15 years of age that the participants reached adult-like performance.
409
The results of Study 2 support the findings of Study 1, in which the 9-to 11-year-olds answered functioning being primarily discussed (Diamond, 2006, p. 70 ever, presented some evidence that this explanation might be true only for 3-year-olds but not for 4- constraint. This is yet another indication that children's executive control is good enough to allow 606 them to follow the nearest possible world constraint; however, they lack the understanding that they 607 need to do so.
